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ABSTRACT 
As the automotive industry becomes increasingly competitive and global in nature, it 
becomes more important to understand the dynamics of competition and the driving forces 
of key competitors. This working paper analyzes the Japanese automotive manufacturers 
and their primary subcontractors. It describes the Japanese role in the global industry, the 
structure of their domestic industry, changes over the past decade, the bursting of their 
bubble economy, and the implications of these dynamics for the North American auto 
industry. Some aspects of this study parallel Office for the Study of Automotive 
Transportation's recent analysis of the changing structure of the U.S. automotive parts 
industry to permit an international perspective. 
*Chris Lin prepared this paper as a research assistant at The Office for the Study of 
Automotive Transportation, concurrently completing his MBA at the University of 
Michigan. He is presently employed at Ford Motor Company. 

Acknowledgements 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to a number of individuals for their time and 
aid over the past year which contributed to this study: My advisor Professor Frank Strafford for 
this theories and creativity. Professor Gary Saxonhouse for his motivating guidance. Professor 
Stephen Salant for his modelling insights and encouragement. John Warner from the Stats Lab for 
his statistical consulting. Paula Finnegan and Andrew Isztwan for their detailed feedback which 
kept my presentation of material understandable from an undergraduate engineering perspective. 
Phil Carlisle and Jeff Alden for their professional familiarity in the field. Dr. Dan Luria for his 
valuable and intuititive expertise on the industry. Pete Heytler and the Industrial Development 
Division for assisting in early research and development of ideas. And most of all, Dr. Sean 
McAlinden and the Office for the Study of Automotive Transportation for providing me with 
valuable information, insight, resources, and support. 
Although their insights shaped the direction of my study, they are not responsible for the 
use I have made of their comments. 
This study is dedicated to the memory of Glenn Tarr, my boss and mentor during my 
internship with Chevrolet. His dedication and genuine interest in numbers inspired me to further 
sharpen my quantitative and analytical skills in order to put to useful means. 
Table Of Contents 
I . The Macro Perspective ................................................................................ 3 
*The Development of Japan's Role in Global Automotive Industry .......................... 3 
*The Role of the Auto Industry in the Japanese Economy ..................................... 6
I1 . The Japanese Automotive Industry .................................................................. 6 
*Japanese Automotive Firm Structure ............................................................ 6
*Firm Characteristics/Measures ................................................................... 12
*Plants and the Subcontracting Relationship .................................................... 15
*Tension with Supplier and Subcontractor Relationships ..................................... 18 
Geographical Location Analysis .................................................................... 19 
*Firm Cluster Areas ................................................................................ 19 
*Tokyo Metropolitan Area ..................................................................... -19 
*Tokyo Headquarters and Cluster with Scattered Operations.. ............................. 21 
*Aichi Prefecture/Nagoya Area ................................................................. 23 
*Osaka Prefecture (Kansai area) ............................................................... 26 
*Hiroshima Prefecture ........................................................................... 26 
*Tokai Region .................................................................................... 27 
*Merits and Implications of Clustering .......................................................... 27 
*Movement to New Areas in Japan -Domestic Regionalization ............................ 29 
*Movement Overseas - Global Regionalization ................................................ -34 
IV . Bursting of the Japanese Bubble Economy ....................................................... 38 
*Description - Rise of the Bubble .............................................................. 38 
*The Bursting of the Bubble ...................................................................... 39 
*Implications and Recent Developments in the Auto Industry ................................ 40 
V . New Paradigm for the Japanese Automotive Industry ........................................... 43 
VI . Summary and Discussion .......................................................................... -46 
Appendix 1 ................................................................................................... 50 
................................................................................................... Appendix 2 59 
Appendix 3 ................................................................................................... 63 
Appendix 4 .................................................................................................. -69 
Other References ............................................................................................ 72 
I. THE MACRO PERSPECTIVE 
The Development of Japan's Role in Global Automotive Industry 
Even though Detroit is still heralded as the auto capital of the world, Japan has produced 
more vehicles per year than the United States since 1980. Figure 1 compares U.S. and Japanese 
vehicle production. U.S. production fluctuated between 7 and 13 million over the past two 
decades, moving closely with domestic economic cycles, particularly after the oil shocks of 1974 
and 1980. In contrast, Japanese production has been growing consistently over the past two 
decades from 5.3 million in 1970 to its 1990 peak of 13.5 million. The Japanese automotive 
industry developed in three stages: (1) infant domestic development, (2) export driven, and (3) 
regionalization. 
Figure 1: Light Vehicle Production 
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Figure 2: Motor Vehicle Registratior 
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Figure 3: Japanese Passenger Car Exports 
and Domestic Production; 1970- 1992 
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Since 1985, the Japanese assemblers have developed regionalization strategies in order to 
offset trade tension and the appreciation of the yen. Transplants were established in the U.S. and 
Europe, and exports began to diminish. While the need for regionalization, or localized production, 
is apparent, there have been difficulties in successfully implementing this third phase of 
development. Negative growth in foreign market penetration between 1990 and 1992, combined 
with the sluggishness of the Japanese economy, has led to the first ever decline in production over a 
two-year period since World War 11. The role of the automotive industry in the Japanese economy 
and internal structure of the industry must be analyzed to understand the severity and permanence of 
this phenomenon. 
The Role of the Auto Industry in the Japanese Economy 
The production of motor vehicles (shipments of Y31,344 billion) accounted for over 10 
percent of total Japanese manufacturing and 30 percent of all machinery manufacturing in 1986.' 
The automotive industry is also an important source of employment for Japan: 5.5 million 
employees (over 10 percent of the 54.4 million total labor force) are either directly or indirectly 
employed in the industry. Over 200,000 workers are employed by assemblers and their 
subcontractors; the rest are employed in the supplier network and other supporting industries.2 
THE JAPANESE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 
Japanese Automotive Firm Structure 
The Japanese automotive industry is characterized by a pyramid-hierarchical structure (see 
exhibit 1). In 198 1, there were eleven assemblers and 9,500  supplier^.^ Approximately 500 
suppliers are considered primary suppliers due to their scale of operation, level of technologicd 
sophistication, and relationship with the assembler. A survey conducted by the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) in 1977 reveals the division of labor in the industry by 
modeling an unnamed automaker and its supplier relationships (see exhibit 2). It demonstrates that 
the critical tasks are performed by the primary suppliers and the assemblers, while the secondary 
suppliers do most of the work. Tertiary suppliers assist the secondary suppliers by performing the 
more cumbersome and labor-intensive jobs. In  periods of high demand, tertiary suppliers 
outsource, or send work out, to small parts shops located in backyards and garages; these 
Fourin Inc., The Japan Auto-Parts Industries. (Nagoya City, Japan: Fourin Inc, 1989). 
In 1982, 7 percent were in directly related ficlds such as OEMs 8: suppliers (696,000), sales & maintenance (997,003, fuel 
supply (248,000) uanspon and rental(1,594,000). The rcst arc in indirect fields such as materials supplies (716,000), fuel 
supplies, insurance, advertising, and othcr service providers (5 15,000). In contrast, the 3.72 million American automotive 
related jobs in 1982 represented 3.9 percent of total employment and 19.7 percent of employment in the manufacturing sector. 
Sourcc: Robert E. Cole and Taizo Yukushiji, The American and Japanese Auto Industries in Transition. The Center for 
Japancsc Studies -The University of Michigan and Technova Inc., Japan, 1984, pp. 20-21. 
Dodwcll Marketing Consultants. The S~ruaure  of [he Japanese Moror Components Industry, (Tokyo. Dodwell Marketing, 
1982). 
Exhibit 1: Structure of Japanese Automotive Industry 
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Exhibit 2: Division of Labor in the Japanese Automotive Industry 
/ (Unnamed) \ 
Source: Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, Mnisky of International Trade and Industry (A survey 
conducted in 1977) 
Notes: 1. The number of companies for "Primary Suppliers," "Secondary" and "Tertiary" 
subcontractors include possible overlappings. 
2. The figures in parentheses for "Primary Suppliers," "Secondary," and "Tertiary" subcontr;lctors show 
Ihe respective percentages of small- and medium-sized businesses to the total in the respective sectors. 
Small and Medium Enterprise Agency defies a small- and medium-sized manufacturing fm as a 
company which employs fewer than 300 workers andlor whose paid-up capital is less than 100 
million yen. 
family-run operations provide the family with extra income, and provide even the lowest tier of 
suppliers a buffer for production. The lower tiers provide to the tiers directly above them as 
needed, and the higher tiers attempt to keep the tier directly below them content This relationship is 
often described as paternalistic. 
Most primary suppliers are subsidiaries or affiliates of the assembler; this lateral holding of 
stocks and intertwining of relationships is typical of the classical kereitsu ~ y s t e m . ~  In 1990, 167 
parts makers had equity relationships with vehicle makers; 53 of these parts makers had vehicle 
makers as their top shareholders. Table 1 provides further detail of the equity relationships. The 
sharing of interests creates a mutually dependent relationship: the supplier depends on the assembler 
for its sales and often finance capital, and the assembler depends on the supplier for technological 
advancements and uncompromised quality. This interdependence leads to customer and product 
speciahzation for most suppliers, yet few assemblers are dependent on any single supplier for a 
single part. Thus, the client (assembler) is considered the patron. In fiscal year 198 1, the members 
of Auto Parts Industries Association (composed of 310 auto parts makers) delivered 84 percent of 
their output to their patron assemblers. Typically, a small group of suppliers will account for 70 
percent to 100 percent of the supply of any one particular item. 
Keiretsu is defined here as "groups of (Japanese) business f i s  tied by common industry or financial interest, and centrally 
coordinated by a bank, trading company, or major manufacturer." Taken from Keiretsu, USA.: A Tale of Japanese Power, 
Mid-America Project, Inc., KY, July, 1991. 
9 
Table 1: Parts Makers Owned by Vehicle Companies (as of fiscal 1990) 













Note: The numbers enclosed in parantheses denote parts makers of which the vehicle manufacturers are the top 
shareholders. 
In contrast to the American supplier structure, Japanese companies purchase a large portion 
of their components from a small set of primary suppliers (see exhibit 3). Thus, the number of 
suppliers that they interact with is smaller, and the relationship requires a greater level of reliability 
and long-term commitment. While some of the primary suppliers may be closely tied to the 
assembler (as are the auto parts divisions of the American firms) the Japanese assembler is not held 
accountable for the supplier's profitability or headcount. This provides the assembler a buffer when 
adjusting to production changes and the economic environment. The primary suppliers shift a 
portion of this adjustment cost to the secondary suppliers, who in turn transfer some to the tertiary 
levels. 
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Exhibit 3: Comparison by Division of Labor: Japan vs. The United States 
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Honda, Mitsubishi, and Mazda have the simple, lateral, group structure illustrated in 
exhibits 1 and 2, above. Suzuki and Isuzu's structures are comparable, but they also share a 
relationship with General Motors. Toyota and Nissan's groups are more complex, as they also 
possess longitudinal relationships with another pair of assemblers. 
Firm Characteristics/Measures 
Although the Japanese assemblers have similar characteristics, it is important to understand 
the differences among the various groups. This study analyzes the eleven automotive assemblers 
and their key assembly subcontractors. In order to examine the dynamics of industry structure over 
time, data will be used to construct snapshots of the industry in 1981 and 1990.5 The analysis will 
consider the groups' size in terms of employment, production, plant number and capacity, the plant 
ratios among different types of facilities, productivity, supplier relationships, overseas investment, 
and geographic location. 
In terms of domestic production, Toyota is the largest vehicle producer, followed closely by 
Nissan. The remaining seven companies together make up the final third of Japanese domestic 
production. Table 2 summarizes the key characteristics of the Japanese automotive manufacturers, 
and highlights a number of changes in the Japanese automotive industry during the 1 9 8 0 ~ . ~  Four 
new plants were constructed: a tool and die plant, and an electronic plant by Toyota, a transmission 
plant by Fuji Heavy, and an engine plant by Isuzu. Employment decreased by 7.4 percent to 
approximately 203,000 employees. Production increased by 8.3 percent to approximately 992,000 
vehicles per month. These trends indicate that the Japanese auto industry has been increasing its 
capacity through investment in new plants and equipment. Japanese auto industry wages have 
increased four-fold from 1975 to 1991, as shown i n  figure 5. Rising Japanese labor costs 
Data were collected from Dodwell Marketing Consultants, Fourin Inc., and company annual reports. 
Appendix 1 provides detailed information on each plant including location, employment, monthly production, and products 
produced there. 

industry wages have increased four-fold from 1975 to 1991, as shown in figure 5. Rising Japanese 
labor costs promoted the use of addtional investment in plants and equipment. The shift toward 
more capital intensive plants was a necessary response to a general shortage of manufacturing labor, 
as well as higher, and therefore more expensive, skill requirements needed in the production 
process. While the use of additional capital allows further gains in productivity, it also redefines the 
competitive strength of the production system. 
Figure 5: Automotive Industry Wages, 
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Source: Monthly Labor Statistics, Japanese Ministry of Labor 
Capacity utilization for Japanese auto plants is estimated by dividing monthly production by 
the estimated monthly capacity provided in Dodwell. This calculation indicates that capacity 
utilization rates ranged from 75 percent to 215 percent. The number of plants calculated above 100 
percent indicates an extra shift or overtime. The flexibility of labor-intensive plants, volume 
buffers provided by the patron-supplier relationships, and the portfolio of export markets all 
provide Japanese assemblers with the ability to maintain high capacity utilization rates. 
Productivity was estimated by dividing the monthly production by the total employees in the 
company. Although this is not the traditional measure of productivity (direct labor hours per 
vehicle), the number provides some measure to differentiate efficiency among producers and gauges 
each organization's improvement over the decade. Mitsubishi experienced the greatest absolute gain 
in productivity. Toyota's productivity also increased substantially, but seemingly at the expense of 
its subcontractors. Nissan has improved its productivity, but needs to improve it further in order to 
compete with the most productive assemblers. Honda's productivity improved; Mazda's 
productivity declined. With higher labor costs in 1980s, it became imperative for Japanese 
automotive f i  to increase labor productivity; most Japanese companies chose to accomplish this 
objective by investing in capital equipment. 
Plants and the Subcontracting Relationship7 
The total number of plants utilized by the eleven manufacturers and their subcontractors was 
83 in 1981, and 88 in 1990. In both periods, about half of the plants were used for assembly, and 
nearly one-fifth of the plants were run by subcontractors. Toyota and Nissan were the largest users 
of subcontractors; eleven of sixteen plants assembling Toyota vehicles were subcontracted, and 
nine of the fourteen plants producing Nissan vehicles were subcontracted. The data obtained for 
this study focus on the subcontractors that assemble vehicles on a consignment basis for the eleven 
assemblers. The analysis primarily looks at the component plants owned by the assembler and the 
subcontracted assembly relationships, even though the kereitsu system also includes other primary 
suppliers sourcing components. 
Exhibit 4 illustrates the subcontracting relationship of the Toyota Group. Daihatsu and Hino 
Motors are included with other subsidiaries and subcontractors in the group. Toyota is able to 
influence these smaller companies, with its 14.6 percent stake in Daihatsu and a 10.4 percent 
interest in Hino. The relationship also allows Toyota to bolster the subsidiary's financial strength, 
Dodwell, Fourin Inc., and company annual reports and publications. 
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product planning, parts rationalization, and overseas marketing capability. Hino and Daihatsu 
produce their own brands and also are subcontracted to produce Toyota-badged cars and trucks. 
Subcontractors accounted for approximately 46 percent of the 4 million Toyota-badged vehicles 
produced in Japan in 1981, and about 40 percent of the 4.1 million Toyotas produced in Japan in 
1990. Toyota and its subcontractors were thus able to produce approximately 70 percent of the 
volume of GM vehicles produced in North America, with only half the number of plants. 
Nissan's structure parallels Toyota's, except that Daihatsu is replaced by Fuji Heavy, and 
Hino is replaced by Nissan Diesel. Fuji Heavy and Nissan Diesel are Japanese assemblers that are 
also subcontractors for Nissan. Nissan owns 6.3 percent of Fuji Heavy and 45.6 percent of Nissan 
Diesel. Nissan and Fuji Heavy joined forces in 1968 to produce Nissan passenger cars, and have 
since shared management and some financial relations. Fuji Heavy also produces its own brand, 
Subaru. Nissan Diesel, a leading manufacturer of diesel trucks and engines, produces Nissan brand 
light-duty trucks for its parent company. Approximately 40 percent of the 3.1 million Nissan 
vehicles produced in Japan in 1981 were produced by Nissan's subcontractors and subsidiaries. 
This share dropped to approximately 35 percent of 3.5 million vehicles in 1990. 
Honda and Mitsubishi are the two other assemblers that recently began to allow 
subcontractors to assemble vehicles under their respective brand names. Yachiyo Industry produces 
nearly 10 percent of all Honda-badged vehicles produced in Japan, and Toyo Koki produces 
multipurpose vehicles for Mitsubishi. 
The subcontracting relationship is valuable to assemblers because it allows them to achieve 
significantly greater production without having to own all of the capacity. This gives them added 
flexibility to adjust to market conditions, and at the same time allows the assembler to maintain full 
employment and continue to operate at high capacity utilization rates. This relationship reduces risk 
and hedges investment. Furthermore, keeping the same loyal workers and continuing to operate 
the plant at high rates of capacity utilization allows management to continuously improve in-house 
productivity. Productivity advances result from innovations in process technology, cross-functional 
working teams, and close working relationships with primary suppliers. Japan's top four 
assemblers, all of which use subcontractors for assembly, were able to increase their productivity 
substantially between 198 1 and 1990. 
Tension with Supplier and Subcontractor Relationships 
While the subcontracting relationships and the kereitsu structure have been largely 
responsible for the competitiveness of the Japanese automotive industry, the subcontracting 
relationship can also be a burden, if the parent companies spread their resources too thinly over 
noncompany personnel and management systems. Moreover, the current economic climate and 
competitive environment have put special pressures on the unique structure of the Japanese auto 
industry. Current automotive markets require longer production runs and fewer models and the 
subcontractors responsible for producing established platforms or niche vehicles will have to alter 
their traditional roles. Kereitsu group membership is no longer a guarantee of success. The 
declining profitability of suppliers is another signal that the system is strained. 
Even during the automotive boom in Japan in 1989-1990, financial statements indicated that 
the assemblers gained at the expense of their suppliers. The announcements of financial reports in 
fiscal 1989 reveal a significant gap in profits between the vehicle manufacturers and parts suppliers 
in Japan. While nine of the eleven manufacturers posted significant increases in domestic sales, 
approximately 30 percent of auto suppliers suffered a drop in profits despite an increase in sales 
turnover. Another 50 percent remained unchanged financially. Suppliers of equipment and 
electronic parts were able to achieve gains i n  sales and profitability during the auto sales boom. 
The key drivers squeezing the profits of suppliers during the mid 1980s included the 
following: (1) labor shortages, which caused a surge in labor costs, (2) rising output, which drove 
suppliers to invest in automation and flexible equipment to make up for the labor constraint, (3) 
shorter product cycles, which made it imperative to achieve shorter runs and smaller lots and 
diminished the potential gains from scale economies, and (4) the necessity of following vehicle 
manufacturers overseas. The operating size of overseas plants is small due to the limited number of 
patron transplant customers, malung it nearly impossible to produce most components at a lower 
cost than in Japan. The pressure on profits is forcing the industry to restructure, which has a 
number of implications on the geographical positioning of production. 
111. GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION ANALYSIS 
The following regional analysis shows that the Japanese auto industry is concentrated in a 
few main industrial areas. It also describes the close geographical proximity between assemblers 
and their primary suppliers, and the geographical independence of the assemblers and their 
assembly subcontractors. Nine of the eleven automotive assemblers have their plants clustered in 
regions within a 150 kilometer radius of each other. Mitsubishi and Honda are exceptions and have 
operations spread across the country. The industry is concentrated in two main regions of Japan: 
(1) the Tokyo metropolitan area and (2) Aichi Prefecture. Some smaller f m s  are clustered in 
locations on the outskirts of these two main regions. Recent investments, though, have started or 
are planned for newly developing areas. The following section on the key areas clustered by 
automotive firms also describes the historic origins of company location and examines the merits of 
clustering. 
Firm Cluster Areas 
Tokyo Metropolitan Area 
Tokyo has been an historic locus of Japanese power since 1590. The shogun Tokugawa 
Ieyasu made the minor castle town of Edo his capitol that year, which marked Japan's transition into 
a commercial state. During the subsequent 250-year Tokugawa era, Edo grew into the largest city 
in the world. The population of Edo reached one million by 1700. A class of merchants and 
artisans emerged to service the large number of daimyo and samurai warlords who were forced to 
spend a part of each year there under surveillance. In 1868, emperor Meiji abolished the shogunate 
and moved his court from Kyoto to Edo, renaming it Tokyo, "Eastern Capitol." The city began a 
T. Kubo, "Under the Auto Booming, Japanese Parts Suppliers Bearing Woes in Profitability," Asian Motor Vehicle 
Business Review, (September 1990): pp. 2-5. 
period of modernization to bring it in line with the West. The daimyo eventually left, and the 
merchants, now able to move more freely, settled in the hilly areas in the western part of the city. 
The modem Tokyo metropolitan area, with a population of 13 million, is the most densely 
populated part of the country, and Japan's government, industry, and commerce are based in this 
capitol city. Heavy and light industries located in this coastal region include automotive, as well as 
electrical appliances, electronics, optical products, precision engineering, textiles, printing, and 
publishing. The 2,000-square-kilometer (800 square mile) metropolitan area houses 24 of the 88 
plants analyzed in this study, and is the location for the headquarters of five of the eleven 
automotive assemblers. 
Nissan is the largest of the assemblers in the Tokyo area, with headquarters in Tokyo and all 
but one of its plants within a 150 kilometer radius of the headquarters. The key subcontractors, 
including Fuji Heavy and Nissan Diesel, are also clustered in the Tokyo area. Fuji Heavy's three 
subcontractor organizations are in the same prefecture. These include 157 firms belonging to the 
Gunma Kyoryoku-Kai organization, 69 firms from Mitaka Kyoryoku-Kai, and 48 firms belonging 
to the Isesaki Kyoryoku-Kai group. The Nissan Diesel Yayoi-Kai is divided into four subgroups, 
which supply rubber, packing, machine parts, and castings, forgings, and pressed parts. 
Even though Toyota is located in the Aichi prefecture, one of its main subcontractors, Hino, 
has three automotive plants located in the Tokyo area. The Hamura plant produces trucks for 
Toyota, the Nitta plant makes cast auto parts, and the headquarters plant in Hino produces medium 
and heavy-duty trucks and buses. Harnura is near the headquarters in Hino-city, which is 30 
kilometers west of Tokyo and 90 kilometers south of Hino's farthest plant in Nitta. 
Isuzu has its headquarters in Tokyo, and initially its automotive plants were all in the Aichi 
prefecture, Tsurimi and Tochigi produce automotive parts, the Kawasaki plant produces medium 
and heavy trucks, and Fujisawa produces light trucks, buses, and cars. Tochigi is in the northern 
part of the prefecture, and the other three plants are south of Tokyo, The new (1992) engine plant 
was built in Hokkaido - very far from the traditional Aichi cluster - and currently has under 300 
employees. The decision to build away from the Aichi cluster may have been based on the wage 
and land costs in the Tokyo area as well as on the saturation of industrial plants and infrastructure 
bottlenecks. Jus t-in- time (JIT) delivery of engines is a major characteristic of the To yo ta production 
system; typically engines are delivered in small lots of six to twelve. The decision to produce 
engines at Hokkaido, so far away from the production cluster may indicate two scenarios: (1) 
Toyota is rethinking its implementation of the JIT production system or (2) the engines are being 
produced for off-shore assembly. 
Tokyo Headquarters and Cluster with Scattered Operations 
Honda has its headquarters in Tokyo, and three of its seven other plants are located nearby 
at the Saitama factory. The Sayama plant produces passenger cars, the Wako plant produces 
engines, and the Mohka plant produces auto parts. The Hamamatsu and Kuamoto plants produce 
motorcycles and are very distant from each other. The Suzuka factory, Honda's largest factory 
(both in terms of floor space and capacity) is located in the KantoIChubu district of Japan. 
Honda's other manufacturing clusters are far from their main manufacturing cluster and 
headquarters in Tokyo; the distance is evidence that some assemblers do produce in more than one 
central location. 
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Mitsubishi is another exception to the company-cluster plant arrangement. With 
headquarters in Tokyo, the Mitsubishi operations also include plants in three other regions of the 
country. Mitsubishi's subcontractor organization, the Kashiwa-Kai, comprises 340 companies. 
The regional subgroups include (1) the Tokyo Motor Vehicle Works, which supply the Kawasaki 
and Maruko plants, (2) the Nagoya Motor Vehicle Works, which supply the Oye and Okaszaki 
plants, (3) the Kyoto Motor Vehicle Works, which supply the Kyoto and Shiga plants, and (4) the 
Mizushima Motor Vehicle Works. Mitsubishi's example further demonstrates that, while it is 
important for primary suppliers to be located near the assemblers, it is not essential for the 
assemblers to be located near each other. Exhibit 5 on the previous page illustrates the dispersed 
operations of Honda and Mits~bishi .~ 
Aichi Pr@ecturelNagoya Area 
Nagoya is Japan's fourth largest city and third largest port, located in the middle of the 
Tokyo-Hiroshima megalopolis. It is a prosperous commercial and industrial city with a population 
of two million. The Aichi prefecture is the second most concentrated automotive area due to the 
presence of Toyota (illustrated in exhibit 6). 
See Appendix 2 for more maps of the location of Japanese domestic automotive facilities. 
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Nagoya Offla 
Toyota Motor Co., Ltd. (TMC) was established on August 28, 1937, with capital of 12 
million yen. Toyota began in the Nagoya region as a spinoff of Toyoda Automatic Loom Works 
(TALWs). Toyoda Automatic Loom Works entered the automotive industry with the launching of 
the Model G1 truck in 1935. In 1936, they completed construction of their first complete 
automobile assembly plant in Kariya - near the TALWs. With a vision for full-scale automobile 
production, the company purchased a large plot of land in Koromo-cho - a municipal region 30 
kilometers east of Nagoya. This undeveloped property covered with trees would emerge as the hub 
of the Toyota Motor Group by the mid 1960s. In the late 1950s, the municipal government of 
Koromo, encouraged by the progress of Toyota's development, drew up plans to be an automobile 
industrial city with TMC at its center. Toyota recommended that its suppliers move to Koromo so 
that they could reinforce production needs for JIT and jib& lo with the affiliated industries.'l In 
1958, Koromo was renamed Toyota City.12 
There are eleven Toyota plants in the prefecture, and nine of them are within the boundaries 
of the Toyota City limits. Toyota's auto parts manufacturing group, the Kyoho Kai, consists of 
224 parts makers, which are regionally organized into three subgroups. The Tokai Kyoho Kai is 
the largest subgroup, consisting of 136 companies located in the Tokai district with Toyota's plants. 
The Kanto Kyoho Kai consists of 63 companies, located in the central part of Japan near Tokyo. 
The third subgroup, Kansai Kyoho Kai, consists of 25 companies clustered in the western part of 
Japan. A number of Toyota's main subcontractors are located outside of the Aichi prefecture. 
Daihatsu is in the Osaka prefecture, and Hino Motors is located near Tokyo. While Toyota's 
example reinforces the importance for primary suppliers to be located near the assemblers in order to 
utilize effectively the JIT production system, it also demonstrates that subcontractors do not have to 
be located near the patron company in order to assemble the patron's vehicles. 
lo  The two main pillars of the Toyota production system are the just-in-time system (having suppliers supply parts on a 
timely, needs basis) and jikoda (self-regulation and building quality into the process). 
l Toyota Motor Company, A History of the First 50 Years. Toyota City: Toyota Motor Corporation, 1988, p. 66. 
l 2  Ibid. p. 146. 
Osaka Prefecture (Kansai area) 
Osaka is a huge industrial and commercial city responsible for a quarter of Japan's industrial 
output. The airports handle 40 percent of total exports. It is home to the country's pharmaceutical 
industry and also produces textiles, iron, and steel. The warlord Hideyoshi founded Osaka in the 
sixteenth century as a city for merchants. The great business and banking dynasties (Sumitomo, 
Itochu, Marubeni, Sanwa; and Daiwa) trace their roots to Osaka. Sanwa and Daiwa are two of 
Daihatsu's five primary banks. Daihatsu was established in 1907, publicly listed in 1949, and 
began producing cars in 1966. In 1968, it began to subcontract for Toyota. 
All four of Daihatsu's automotive plants are located in the Osaka prefecture within an 80 
kilometer radius of the headquarters and main plant in Ikeda. The Shiga and Tada plants produce 
engines, auto parts, and machine tools for captive use. The Kyoto and Ikeda plants produce 
assembled vehicles (including those subcontracted by Toyota). Nearly 80 percent of Daihatsu's 
production is used domestically. Daihatsu's subsidiary, Daihatsu Shatai, has one outside assembly 
facility in Maebashi City, Gunma prefecture, approximately 100 kilometers northwest of Tokyo. 
The Osaka prefecture is next to Toyota's Aichi prefecture, so Daihatsu could supply Toyota with 
parts, if necessary, to support Toyota's production system. 
Hiroshima Prefecture 
Mazda (Toyo Kogyo) is isolated in the lower central part of Japan. Three of Mazda's four 
plants are located in the Hiroshima prefecture, and the Hofu plant is in nearby Yarnaguchi 
prefecture. The myoshi plant produces diesel engines and is approximately 70 kilometers away 
from Hiroshima on Highway 54. The Hofu plant produces compact cars and transmissions and is 
approximately 130 kilometers away from the Hiroshima headquarters via Highway 3. Thus, 
transportation from headquarters to the other plants takes approximately two hours via truck. 
Tokai Region 
Suzuki's three automobile manufacturing plants are located in the Tokai region. The Osuka 
plant makes castings and die castings, and the other two plants each assemble 50 percent of the 
Suzuki vehicle total. Kosai produces minicabs and commercial vehicles, and Iwata produces four- 
wheel drive vehicles and engines. These three plants are located within 65 kilometers of each other. 
The other facilities are dedicated to producing motorcycles and parts. 
Merits and Implications of Clustering 
Clearly, the industry map of Japan (shown in exhibit 7) indicates that the auto industry is 
clustered in a few areas of the country. The map illustrates the size and concentration of the 
clusters. The darker circles indicate a higher concentration. Assemblers of the same company or 
group may tend to locate in the same cluster for the following reasons: 
First, the origins of the auto maker, the historic roots of the cities, and the relationships of 
the automaker with their primary banks, or kereitsu, can influence the geographical outcomes. 
Often, the company's relationship with its primary bank largely determines the location of the head 
office. 
Second, coordination with headquarters and other plants is facilitated by geographical 
proximity. Upstream, it enables primary suppliers to coordinate more efficiently. Downstream, the 
manufacturer will be able to coordinate its delivery and transportation to gain from volume discounts 
in shipping from the same dock. 
Third, the concentration of the firms and the clustering effect of the suppliers with the 
assemblers are logical, given the patron-supplier system and the use of .TIT production methods, 
The proximity of primary suppliers to the patron assemblers is necessary due to the demands of the 
JIT production system. Toyota's example demonstrates the strong influence that the assembler has 
on the supplier's welfare and longevity. Locating in the vicinity demonstrates commitment to the 
Exhibit 7: Plant Clusters of Japanese Vehicle Manufacturers 
Note: The darker shaded areas indicate heavier concentration of plants. 
long-term relationships and allows the groups to implement the demands of the JIT system 
effectively. By positioning all of the assembly plants near a central location, the same supplier will 
be able to supply the same parts to a number of assembly plants with JIT schedules and also realize 
scale economies. If we assume that the minimum efficient scale (MES) for full component 
assembly is 500,000 units annually,13 28 of the 45 assembly plants would not be supplied on an 
efficient scale and JIT basis by their engine and stamping suppliers if the assembly plants were not 
clustered. By clustering, all are able to produce efficiently and just in time. 
Fourth, during postwar reconstruction, there may have been incentives for certain regions of 
the country to develop faster than other regions. While political reasons may have influenced the 
development of the industry, such incentives and demographic characteristics may also influence the 
downsizing and relocation of the industry. 
Despite the merits of clustering, two assemblers, Mitsubishi and Honda, are not clustered. 
Downsides to clustering include the excessive demands for labor, rising land costs, infrastructure 
bottlenecks (which slow the JIT system), the inability to expand production, and congestion (which 
upsets most urbanites). Recruiting qualified workers is nearly impossible in urban areas, but 
trdtional poor farming areas such as Tohoku (in the northeast) and Kyushu have workers 
available. Moreover, strong infrastructures and lower taxes for new start-ups provide incentives to 
decentralize operations. 
Movement to New Areas in Japan - Domestic Regionalization 
The traditional areas of the automotive industry are saturated and no longer ideal, due to high 
land costs and shortages of qualified labor. Evidence of this can be seen in the addition of new 
plants away from the Tokyo and Nagoya areas and recent plant openings in the northern island of 
Hokkaido and the southern island of Kyushu. Hokkaido and Kyushu are new areas of growth for 
l3 This estimate is derived from the minimum efficient scale for engine and transmission plants and stamping facilities in the 
U. S.; further, it assumes that the Japanese plants are under comparable constraints as American and European assemblers. 
29 
the automotive industry. Exhibit 8 illustrates how the industry is relocating from concentrated 
central regions to the less-concentrated northern and southern areas. 
Toyota started up a parts plant in autumn, 1992, to join the existing Isuzu plant on 
Hokkaido. For the first time since the late 1980s, parts are transported via railway; truck transport, 
the conventional method of parts delivery, was unable to meet excessive demands. Low land prices 
and high quality of life have made this island an attractive place for a number of foreign f i  to 
establish their new start ups. With an area equivalent to that of Austria, a population equal to 
Denmark's, and a GNP falling between that of those two nations, Hokkaido is comparable to a 
single European nation, with plenty of room to grow. In the 1990s, Hokkaido is seeking to engage 
in direct exchanges with other countries rather than routing exchanges through Tokyo, as has been 
done in the past.14 
Kyushu, the south western island of Japan, is emerging as the new subcenter of the 
Japanese auto industry. Toyota's new vehicle production facility in Kyushu started up in spring, 
1993, joining the operating Nissan vehicle production, and Honda motorcycle engine and 
transmission facilities. Mazda and Daihatsu's planned plants on this southern island will bring the 
total of firms with facilities on this southern island to five by 1996. Suppliers have followed the 
assemblers as would be expected. In Kyushu alone, 128 f i s  built new facilities between 1990 
and 1992; previously only 107 plants were located there. 
Toyota's decision to expand beyond its traditional clustering in the Mikawa district in the 
Aichi prefecture is rather revolutionary. Although it allows the company to escape the land and 
labor costs of operations in the Aichi area, i t  adds significant costs to parts transport and signals 
that the merits of concentration in Mikawa may be weaker than they once were. The labor shortage 
is the primary driver of this change; the regionalization of production facilities seeks to ensure an 
adequate workforce. In 1990, President of Toyota, Dr. Shoichiro Toyoda, stated "Plant 
l 4  Yokomichi Takahiro. "Hokkaido, the New Frontier for Foreign Companies in Japan," Tokyo Business Today, 61 (March 
1993) pp. 28. 
Exhibit 8: Declustering of Japanese Vehicle Manufacturers 
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decentralization has both advantages and disadvantages - the advantage of solving the labor 
shortage problem was judged to be more important than the disadvantages."15 Plans to start up 
another new electrical parts production facility in the Tohoku province (northeast Japan) in 1994 
reinforce the pattern of regionalization, decentralization, and in-house production. 
By 1995, Toyota's Hirose plant will be expanded, and the Tohoku plant will be built, thus 
allowing Toyota to have 10 percent of its electronics production in-house. By initiating its own in- 
house electronics development and utilizing suppliers other than Nippondenso or Aisin Seiki, 
Toyota has (1) transformed its long-standing, two-supplier system for electronics, (2) introduced 
more competition and spread out its investment, and (3) developed its own expertise in electronics. 
Nippondenso's diversification of customers domestically and abroad combined with its use of 
second-tier suppliers outside the traditional Toyota Group may signal further breakup of the kereitsu 
supplier system.16 As competition increases, it may become imperative for assemblers to cross 
kereitsu lines and align with the strongest suppliers possible-a strategy inconceivable in the past. 
Also, suppliers may be forced to sell to nonpatron customers in order to further develop their 
businesses. 
While it appears that the development of these new regional areas has eased the problem of 
land constraints, the challenge of labor shortages is met for only the short term, As the birth rate 
slows, the population ages, and working hours decline, the labor shortage will continue to be a 
serious obstacle for the Japanese companies. 
It appears that the current phase of overseas expansion to North America and Europe is 
over. The Japanese assemblers are planning to reconcentrate their efforts on domestic production 
and expansion into other Pacific Rim countries. There were five new assembly plants built during 
the 198 1- 1990 period analyzed earlier. Nine new facilities (scheduled for completion by 1995) will 
l5  H. Niiyama, "Toyota's New Plant Construction Project and Future of the Group Production," Asian Motor Vehicle 
Business Review 1 (August 1990): p. 3. 
l6 Tetsuo Kubo and Hiroshi Nakano, "Toyota Moving Electronics Production In-House," Asian Automotive Business 
Review 3 (April 1992.): p. 6. 
add another 1.75 million vehicles to the current production capacity (see table 3). Nissan and 
Toyota have already set up their new plants in Kyushu, and Mazda has expanded its Hofu 
factory.'' However, a number of f m  are reassessing their investment and expansion plans as 
production capacity outstrips the market demand. Daihatsu, for example, has delayed construction 
of the second stage of its Shiga factory until 1995 and has put on hold its construction of a Kyushu 
facility. The large capital investments and increasing labor costs have raised break-even points and 
the minimum efficient scale of plants. Managing plants to yield a high capacity utilization rate is 
even more challenging in the current environment. Much of the capacity that produced vehicles for 
export to North America and Europe in the 1980s has been replaced by transplant operations. Table 
4 provides estimates of the Japanese production capacity in the three major regions. 
Table 3: Japanese Automakers' New and Planning Domestic Facilities 
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Ryuoh the second facility 
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The third line of Suzuka facility 
Annual Production 
Capacity 
200 thousand vehicles 
130 thousand vehicles 
100 thousand vehicles 
100 thousand vehicles 
240 thousand vehicles 
160 thousand vehicles 
180 thousand vehicles 
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170 thousand vehicles 
190 thousand vehicles 













Table 4: Japanese Automotive Industry's Productive Capacity in the United States, Europe, and Japan 
(Vehicles) (est.) 
Source: Asian Auto Business Review, March 1992, Volume 3, Number 3, p.4. 





2. Production increase capacity in Japan includes 240,000 vehicles at Nissan's second Kyushu facility beginning 
in 1992. Toyota's Miyata, Kyushu, operation will produce 200,000 vehicles starting in 1993. Mazda will 
expand production at its Bofu facility in 1992 by 160,000 vehicles annually. 
3. Including overseas facilities, the Japanese automotive industry's productive capacity in 1992 is about 17 
million vehicles. Because of the increase of productive capacity in three main regions (U.S.A., Europe, Japan), 
the Japanese automotive industry's (worldwide) productive capacity in 1992 is expected to reach 20 million 
vehicles. 





Movement Overseas - Global Regionalization 
The overseas expansion of the Japanese auto industry has continued at an increasing rate 
over the past decade. Japanese vehicle assembly plants in North America and Europe have 
increased from three in 1985 to seventeen in 1991. Transplant production capacity has increased 
from 640,000 vehicles to three million over the same time period.18 Transplants are new, generally 
efficient, well sited, and serve a political, as well as an economic purpose. They are being used to 
meet local demand in North America and Europe and to export vehicles and parts to Japan and other 
areas of the world.19 Finally, the location of transplants in Europe, as well as the United States, 
serves as a hedge against foreign currency fluctuations. 
Key suppliers have been pressured to follow their patron assemblers abroad. During the 
1980s, Japanese supplier firms established 234 parts facilities in the United States. Figures 6 and 7 
illustrate how the number of parts facilities established in the United States increased with the 





l 8  Tetsuo Kubo, "Analysis of Automakersf Low Profitability Trend - Serial Worsening Profitability of Toyota, Nissan, and 
Mazda," Asian Automotive Business Review 3 (November 1992): pp. 11-15. 
l9 Mack Chrysler, "Permanent Shift to Transplants'?" Tokyo Business Today 60 (August 1992): pp. 12-13. 
development of transplant assembly operations. The overseas investment presented new 
opportunities to the Japanese auto industry, but also presented new challenges and pressures. 
Clearly, it is beneficial for the assembler to have the same supplier, providing the quality, delivery, 
and service to which the assembler is accustomed. However, the supplier must bear a great burden 
in investing abroad; it is not able to obtain the same scale economies that it could in Japan, due to the 
smaller volumes produced in the United States. The decline in transplant establishments during the 
early 1990s may signal the end of the first wave of expansion, or it may indicate a retreat by the 
suppliers and assemblers that are finding profitability overseas difficult. In either case, further 
penetration by Japanese suppliers in the United States is not likely in the near future. Those that 
have set up shop in the States are now looking to diversify their customer base and product 
portfolio. 
Figure 6 :  Japanese Invested, U.S. Located Part and Component 
Facilities Reported Startups 1982- 1992 
Source: Japanese Automotive Supplier Investment Directory, Fifth Edition, Office for 
the Study of Automotive Transportation. The Universtity of Michigan, page VI 
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Source: Japanese Automotive Supplier Investment Directory, Fifth Edition, Office for 
the Study of Automotive Transportation, The Universtity of Michigan, page VI 
The competitive pressure of almost 300 new Japanese transplant parts facilities have 
encouraged traditional, U.S. suppliers to build modern facilities in order to compete, and have 
forced many other U.S. parts facilities to shut down completely. This intensified competition, 
combined with the Big Three shift in purchasing strategies, 20 has forced traditional American 
suppliers to adapt swiftly to the changing environment in order to survive. 
In contrast to a "community" model of gradual expansion, exemplified by Ford and GM in 
Europe over the past 50 years, the Japanese model of rapidly building new capacity has a number of 
costs from a corporate and societal perspective. Financially, it was costlier to invest in new plants 
and equipment and train new workers. Although the assemblers were able to develop lean 
production systems, the large capital investment forced firms to spread their financial resources; 
this further pressured profitability for assemblers and suppliers. Social and political costs resulted 
Movement towards developing greater long-rem relationships where suppliers are involved in the development process of 
new vehicles and produce subassemblies instead of basic parts. 
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fiom the displacement of thousands of workers and the business failure of numerous suppliers. 
Although transplants now employ over 100,000 in the United States, and it can be argued that the 
American consumer has received higher value as a result of such expansion, the European 
community is not likely to accept such social costs.21 Even though the Japanese assemblers were 
successful at quickly establishing overseas capacity to avert trade friction and to hedge their foreign 
currency risk, they incurred Miculties and social costs, which also must be considered in further 
developing their global strategy. 
Japanese automotive f m s  have also been solidifying their presence in the Southeast Asian 
automotive industry-the fasting growing market in the world. The Japanese suppliers located in 
Southeast Asia are able to supply their patrons and also take advantage of the low-cost labor. A 
number of plants make wire harnesses and other labor-intensive items exclusively for export to 
Japan. The Japanese development and commitment to the Southeast Asian automotive industry 
allows Japanese companies to find another source of low-cost labor. The Japanese investment 
allows the Southeast Asian countries to develop their industrial infrastructure; in return, the 
Japanese have a bargaining chip to open these growing auto markets to receive their exports. In 
1990,2 million vehicles were sold in the largest ASEAN nations-Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
and the Philippines; during the late 1980s and early 1990s, automotive sales experienced annual 
growth rates of 30 percent, The Japanese assemblers dominate these markets with an estimated 90 
percent market share.22 While these markets are in early stages of development, they can be 
expected to play an important role in the future of Japan's global automotive strategy. 
Much of the Japanese expansion overseas has been fueled by the success of automotive 
manufacturers in recent years. However, much of their financial success has been amibuted to the 
domestic bubble economy, which has since burst. Japanese firms have been forced to rethink their 
21 Sean McAlinden, "Commentary: A U.S. Perspective on the Globalization of the Automotive Industry," International 
Automotive Industry Forum, Phoenix, Arizona, December 1990. 
22 Tim Barrett, Steve Hartle, Chris Lin, and Don Mills, "American Strategic Entry into ASEAN Nations," corporate strategy 
paper for Professor Majumdar, University of Michigan School of Business Adminisb-ation, March 5, 1993. 
strategic direction under adverse financial situations. The following section describes this economic 
phenomenon, its effects on industry growth, and implications for the auto industry during the post- 
bubble era. 
IV. BURSTING OF THE JAPANESE BUBBLE ECONOMY 
Description: Rise of the Bubble 
The bubble era was a time of rapid and substantial rise in asset prices during the second half 
of the 1980s in Japan.23 Three key developments prompted this growth: 
(1) The sharp appreciation of the yen, prompted by the Plaza Accord of 1985, set Japanese 
interest rates at historically low levels. In 1985, one U.S. dollar was valued at 250 yen; in April 
1993, one dollar was valued at 113 yen. The yen continues to appreciate toward the Y 100/$1 mark. 
The yen more than doubled in value during 1985-1993, so that Japanese consumer spending power 
was greatly enhanced. In 1987, the official Japanese discount rate on bank borrowing was at 2.5 
percent - half the rate in 1985. The low return in savings and the low cost of borrowing prompted 
further consumption and investment. 
(2) As the monetary policy shifted towards accommodation, and firms were more reluctant 
to borrow from banks, there was a sharp increase in financial activity. As asset prices continued to 
rise, their rise reinforced the value of hidden assets on corporate balance sheets, which elevated 
stock prices beyond their real value. Corporations shifted their financing from debt to equity by 
issuing convertible and warrant bonds. Banks shifted their focus from relationship lending to 
speculating in real estate and the stock market.24 
(3) Thirty years of sustained, domestic economic growth gave the Japanese assemblers a 
significant advantage over their international competitors. Bullishness of the Japanese economy 
2 3  See, for example, Ryuichiro Tate, "Special Report: The Bubble Economy," The Nikkei Weekly,  April 12, 1993, pp. 11- 
12. 
24 Maryann N. Keller, "Crisis in Japan - Recessions, Secular Trends Force Industry Restructuring", Furman Selz, Inc., April 
5, 1993. 
was sustained by international expansion and the soaring yen; lenders and borrowers paid less 
attention to risk and excessive investments were made in Japanese assets. 
Amid some of the heaviest trading in market history, the Nikkei 225 Stock Average virtually 
doubled in two years, from 13,113 yen in 1985 to 26,000 yen in 1987. Japan's stock market 
became the largest in the world; in 1987, it accounted for 41.7 percent of the world's total market 
capitalization. Property assets also soared 240 percent over this five year period, from 1,004 trillion 
yen in 1985 to 2,389 trillion yen in 1990. By 1990, the value of Japanese land assets were 
quadruple the value of land assets in the United States. As these asset prices skyrocketed and the 
yen appreciated, consumer confidence and optimism peaked, with the excess spending of the late 
1980s. Japan's per capita GNP had grown from $1 1,000 in 1985 to $24,000 in 1990, the highest 
level of per capita GNP among major industrial nations. 
Although this growth phenomenon was unprecedented, it did not correspond to the 
conditions of the real economy; as the asset prices plummeted, the phenomenon was increasingly 
described as a "bubble." A bubble is defined as the portion of a movement in asset prices that 
cannot be explained by the basis of economic fundamentals. 
The Bursting of the Bubble 
In December 1989, Yashushi Mieno, the new head of the Bank of Japan, deflated the bubble 
by raising the official discount rate several times. The collapse of the stock market in early 1990 
and the plummeting of land prices were clear signs that the bubble had burst.25 By the spring of 
1992, the Nikkei index had settled around 16,500 after a two-year descent from a high of 38,000. 
The collapse has made raising fresh funds through equity financing more difficult, and borrowing 
from banks more expensive. Even though the cost of capital has increased sharply, economists 
assert that this is a return to normal levels. The bursting of the bubble is forcing f m s  as well as 
consumers to change their investment and purchasing behavior. "Until the bubble burst, many 
25 Kermit Lanser, 'Things Japanese: A Shift of Focus," Financial World, (August 4, 1992): p. 92. 
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companies seemed to behave as though it were an implicit assumption that real estate values would 
continue to rise or at least not fall." 26 The sharp decline in value has diminished the value of their 
assets and weakened the purchasing power of their previously free-spending domestic consumers; 
the downturn has adversely affected consumer confidence. Excessive capital investment during the 
bubble era put even more downward pressure on profits and now threatens the Japanese 
commitment to high rates of capital-investment and R&D spending. 
Other unhealthy signs in the real economy include a rise in bankruptcies, a decline in 
industrial productivity, and a fall of corporate profits. The sharp increase in the cost of capital, tight 
labor supply, and the aging population present further challenges for Japan's economy to overcome. 
Other challenges include the decrease in the number of new college graduates in Japan expected to 
begin in 1995, dependence on exports, and growing political pressure abroad. 
Implications and Recent Developments in the Auto Industry 
The automobile industry was a major beneficiary of the bubble economy. Low rate loans 
and equity financing available encouraged a wave of investments by the auto makers. Higher 
consumer wealth led to a boom in automotive sales. New car registrations from 1980 to 1985 
increased by a solid eleven percent, then sales more than tripled during the next five years. The 
excess consumer spending of the bubble era spurred automotive sales beyond expectations and 
Japanese auto companies reaped huge gains.2' These profits were reinvested in new facilities, 
capital improvements, and overseas expansion. 
The industry now suffers from the bursting of the bubble, with declining sales, historically 
low profits, and a weakened presence overseas. The industry declined in 1991 for the first time in 
eleven years; sales were down 3.3 percent. Vehicle sales volumes declined again in 1992, the first 
time in history that Japanese automotive sales have declined significantly for two consecutive years. 
26 Tate Ryuichiro, et al., "Special Report: the Bubble Economy." Nikkei Weekly (April 12,1993): p. 11. 
27 Appendix 3 summarizes the sharp gains in profitability for the automakers and suppliers. 
Sales declined again in 1993 to make it a record third consecutive annual decline.28 Declining 
vehicle sales are not the industry's only major difficulty. The Japanese auto industry now finds 
itself saddled with inappropriate product development and marketing strategies. The end of rapid 
growth in disposable incomes with the bursting of the the bubble economy also signaled the end of 
growth in markets for high-end and niche vehicles. In recent years, models were frequently 
upgraded to provide fresh styling, and record product proliferation took place to capture and retain 
sales. A new "value" emphasis has appeared in Japanese auto markets. The industry must 
restructure to adjust to new, modest expectations of Japanese car buyers. 
The decline in profitability was traumatic. Combined annual profits in 1992 for Japanese 
automakers dropped more than 50 percent to Y500 billion from around Y 1.1 trillion in peak years. 
Three of Japan's automakers reported losses.29 Toyota's 1992 fiscal settlement announced that 
profits were down 63 percent from the previous year. In 1993, Nissan announced its first ordinary 
loss since public offering. Honda and Mazda expected poor profits for their 1993 settlements. 
The increased number of facilities has lead to lower capacity utility rates, and therefore, 
lower profits. Decreased profits have also resulted from higher production costs - mainly the cost 
of materials and parts. This trend has continued since the mid 1980s, but now sales are not 
increasing to keep up with the increased costs. Moreover, a declining capital-turnover ratio delays 
the investment recovery period, while depreciation costs are at record levels. Toyota's profit-to- 
sales ratio dropped to 3.96 percent in 1992, the first time in over a decade that the ratio has dipped 
below the 4 percent level (the ratio necessary for paying out expected dividend and wage hikes). 
Even though Toyota is the most efficient Japanese producer in terms of unit cost, it still suffers from 
severely high futed costs traced to recent, massive investments in plant, equipment and product 
development. The cost of capital investment and R&D outlays, carried out with the bubble 
economy to forge a "strong company," have rapidly swelled as interest rates have risenS3O During 
28 Tokyo Business Today, February 3 ,  1993. 
29 Dr. Shimokawa Koichi, "The Auto Industry Enters an Era of Restructuring and Globalization," Journal of Japanese Trade 
and Industry; 4 (1993): pp. 8-1 1. 
the bubble period, many of the firms invested in long-term projects, such as new factories, that only 
made sense at very low interest rates. These investments are not generating much cash flow to 
cover the borrowings that were used to finance them. Even though the capital was cheap up front, 
the average borrowing is proving to be quite costly.3 
Between 1984 and 1991, Japanese automakers shifted their financing from debt to equity by 
issuing $25 billion in convertible and warrant bonds. In the bullish economy, it was expected that 
the stock prices would continue to rise, and obligations would be converted. After stock prices 
declined to reflect their real value, lenders asked to be paid back; companies were faced with the 
prospect of refinancing with straight debt and higher interest rates, or liquidating assets to pay their 
 obligation^.^^ This increased cost of capital is causing financial distress for operations abroad as 
well. 
Japanese investment overseas fell by 28.3 percent in fiscal 1992, the third consecutive 
annual drop. Annual investment outlays now total about one-third of the $49.1 billion for the peak 
year of 1989.33 Moreover, about 20 Japanese parts manufacturers have withdrawn from the 
European market due to the collapse of Japan's bubble economy and the economic recession in 
Europe. The Japan External Trade Organization said its survey of new Japanese f m s  moving into 
the European market also hit a low of 27, compared with 1 12 in 1990 and 56 in 1991.34 
The bursting of the bubble has slowed the momentum of American exports to Japan. Total 
imported (into Japan) car sales for 1991 were 197,184 units, down 12.1 percent from the previous 
30 Ryoichi Higurashi and Momoko Ito, "Japanese Aulomnkers Rethink Efficiency vs. Profit," Tokyo Business Today 60 
(March 1992): p. 39. 
Michael Smitka, The Decline of the Japanese Auto I n d u s r n  - Domestic and International Implications, Working paper 
from the Washington and Lee University, July 1992. p. 32. 
32 Keller, Crisis in Japan, page number unavailable. 
33 Agence France Presse, May 9,1993. 
3 4 ~ a p a n  Economic Newswire, March 27. 1993. 
year. Most of the loss was incurred by the German luxury car makers (GM sales grew at a slower 
rate (5.3 percent) and Ford sales declined slightly). 
To summarize the effects on the Japanese automotive industry, the bubble economy 
enhanced domestic sales, product proliferation, profitability, equity financing, capital investment, 
and overseas expansion. As the assets grew larger than their real value in the bubble economy, the 
effects on the automotive industry were severe. The rise of the bubble enhanced the resources of 
the Japanese automotive industry. But since the economy is indeed a bubble that has burst, it leaves 
behind a number of real, short-term dilemmas, which the auto companies must solve in order to 
prosper again. 
In his book-Rejuvenation of t h  Japanese Economy: Beyond t h  Bubble Economy- 
Yoshio Suzuki, chairman of the Nomura Research Institute and one of Japan's leading economists, 
proposes three major directions for Japan to take: (1) benefitting consumers through economic 
policies; (2) reforming the financial system; and (3) maintaining the free trade system and making 
other meaningful contributions to the global order.35 Applications of these reforms for the 
automotive industry would take out the inefficiencies of the distribution systems, thereby making 
automobiles more affordable, and motivating the industry to promote free trade. Tactically, this 
would mean opening the Japanese market to foreign competition and developing a more balanced 
trade account with key trading partners, through local procurement strategies and local assembly. 
V. NEW PARADIGM FOR THE JAPANESE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 
Analysis of the changes in the Japanese automotive industry over the past decade indicate 
that the kereitsu relationships, once heralded as Japan's secret for competitiveness during its 
emergence as a world-class competitor in the automotive industry, will be loosening due to the 
pressures of the domestic economy and the globally competitive environment. 
35 Michio Uchida, "Now Even the Public Wonders: Is Japan at a Crossroads?" Tokyo Business Today 60 (September 1992) 
pp. 14-16. 
Key findings from the geographical analysis indicate that the traditional clusters of firm 
operations are beginning to decentralize in order to escape the labor shortages and infrastructure 
constraints. The regionalization strategies will evolve in the form of declustering of operations 
within Japan and diffusion of the value chain internationally, Globally, the Japanese are adjusting 
to the shift in comparative labor advantage by moving labor-intensive production of components to 
Southeast Asia (and to China in the future) for export to Japan. The Japanese f m s  are continuing 
to adapt to the political pressures from North American and European industries and governments 
with increased transplant production in the local markets. While this strategic shift temporarily 
diminished volume efficiency in Japan, such a move was inevitable due to the shortages of land and 
labor and the rising yen. Finally, the redistribution of operations worldwide allows the Japanese 
f m s  to be closer to the markets that they sell in, offers a number of cost advantages, and allows 
them to hedge currency risks over the long term. 
The postregionalization phase of the Japanese auto industry signals a diminishing role of 
Japan's export of fully assembled vehicles to the traditional markets of North America and Europe. 
No longer will these full-assembly, fm clusters, responsible for such a large portion of Japan's 
exports, be concentrated in one firm's specific area. Rather, the f m s  will decentralize into newly 
developing industrial areas (i.e., the islands of Kyushu and Hokkaido) in order to escape the labor 
shortages of the trdtional clusters. It appears that overcapacity will still exist in Japan in the 
middle of the 1990s, but traditional areas will gradually ramp down as the working hours and the 
number of qualified workers diminish. This decline should offset the increased production capacity 
created by the new emerging areas. Nissan's closing of its Zarna assembly plant and relocation of 
workers into Kyushu is an example of the shift and dilution of focus. The closing of plants in 
traditional clusters wdl continue to alleviate the issue of overcapacity. Most likely, the older plants 
and the facilities too small to accommodate automation will be the first to shut down. Not only will 
the clusters gradually dilute, but the export share of total vehicles will decline as transplant 
production ramps up to meet overseas demand. Extra capacity will force Japanese assemblers to 
seek out new export opportunities in other nontraditional areas. Southeast Asia, China, Latin 
America, and Eastern Europe are among the top contenders for new growth opportunities. 
Even though exports of fully assembled vehicles to traditional markets have begun to 
decline, trade continues to be active. The content of exports will change because assembly facilities 
have been constructed in the major markets of North America and Europe, and labor-intensive parts 
manufacturers have been positioned in Southeast Asia. Labor-intensive parts (e.g., wire harnesses) 
will be produced in Southeast Asia for export to Japan. High value-added parts and critical 
components will be assembled in Japan for export to the large market economies. Japan will shift 
its export content from fully assembled vehicles to engines and transmissions - the high value- 
added parts and critical technologies that require the largest economies of scale. In effect, Japan will 
be able to globally source this technology for final assembly in its assembly plants located world- 
wide. Local content regulations, pressure from domestic parts makers, and market fundamentals 
will encourage local sourcing of other parts as the kereitsu relationships dissolve. 
This gradual, yet fundamental, shift from export strategy to transnational regional strategy 
has a number of important implications. As capacity and production shift overseas, and the 
domestic market matures, the production of Japanese vehicles in Japan will decline unless it is offset 
with new export opportunities elsewhere. The loss of scale economies will force the industry to 
restructure in order to remain competitive. In order to offset inefficiencies created from this 
regionalization, automakers will have to lengthen their product cycles and reduce the variety of 
different components so that parts makers can regain economies of scale with longer production 
runs, Although local content requirements will make opportunities for local parts makers more 
accessible, global sourcing of critical components will replace the exporting of fully assembled 
vehicles. 
VI. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
This paper discusses the evolution of the Japanese automotive industry structure, and 
suggests areas for restructuring. Improving relations between the assemblers and their suppliers is 
not the sole solution to the complex situation; suppliers have been faced with a number of obstacles 
and continue to receive intensified pressure from their patrons. The following conditions pressure 
the system to change: the productivity plateau, labor shortages, infrastructure bottlenecks, slowed 
growth in domestic demand, trade hctions, continued appreciation of the yen, and rapid 
technolo~cal changes. Moreover, the bursting of the bubble economy has exacerbated the severity 
of the situation. 
In response to these changing conditions, the parts makers are undertaking a number of 
initiatives including (1) the rationalization of production: extending runs to achieve economies of 
scale; (2) customer diversification: extending relationships beyond the patron to customers outside 
the conventional group; (3) product diversification: conducting their own R&D and producing 
more of their own products; and (4) overseas investments: supplier transplants to follow the patron 
business overseas, and sourcing from operations in low-wage Southeast Asian countries and 
Chi11a.3~ 
The loosening of kereitsu relationships and the trend towards the initiatives discussed may 
result in mergers among parts makers and moves toward relationships with leading suppliers 
outside the kereitsu group.37 AS this trend unfolds globally, American suppliers attempting to 
obtain orders from Japanese transplants will no longer face the same burden of overcoming the 
kereitsu lines, but will have to be world-class suppliers in order to survive the rationalization of the 
parts industry. Survivors will be able to develop high value-added products and maintain high 
levels of productivity. Large production capacity and superior management capability are also 
critical success factors. 
36 Fourin Inc., The Japan Auto Purls Industries, (Nagoya City, Japan: Fourin Inc.,1989-90). 
37 Further upsueam, vehicle makers will strive to use common parts with other manufactures; for instance, Mazda and 
Nissan have jointly developed automatic uansmissions through JATCO. 
As Japanese assemblers face the new realities of the postbubble, postcontinuous-growth era, 
they must further differentiate their competitive strategies and focus on their core strengths. In the 
continuous-growth era, all Japanese auto companies would attempt to compete head-to-head in most 
segments and in most areas of the value chain. This style of competition was effective in the past 
decades due to (1) the growing and protected domestic market, (2) the opportunities for entry and 
growth in large international markets, (3) the comparative advantages of low labor costs and a 
weak yen, (4) the gains in productivity from technical and process innovation, (5) the lean 
production system, which emphasized JIT delivery and jikoda, and (6) commitment of the supplier 
base, which further enhanced potential gains. With these advantages, the newly challenged 
Japanese automotive companies must now adapt to a new economic environment, restructuring, and 
developing a new source of competitive advantage. 
In order to confront the domestic land and labor shortages, the auto manufacturers are 
declustering their operations by moving to Hokkaido and Kyushu islands. Production and 
employment have been gradually dissipating from the concentrated clusters out to these newly 
industrialized regions; this movement alleviates the infrastructure constraints on congested clusters. 
The Japanese also escaped their labor shortage by establishing operations overseas. Transplant 
operations in North America and Europe circumvent trade pressures, and new facilities in Southeast 
Asia provide the Japanese f m s  with a low-cost source of skilled labor. China, another source of 
low-cost labor, may play a larger role in the near future. Both areas also represent large potential 
export markets. 
Producing in the three main continental regions of North America, Europe, and Asia allows 
the Japanese automotive companies to hedge against foreign currency fluctuation - in particular, 
the further appreciation of the yen. However, spreading out production capacity among various 
markets creates disadvantages in terms of diluting the concentrated high volume necessary for 
achieving economies of scale. The challenge is to balance the currency hedge and the capacity 
hedge so that the system is insulated from foreign currency fluctuation, and yet able to reach 
efficient production levels. The balance is easier to attain if the vehicles and operational income are 
able to move freely from country to country, and if localization rates can be varied. High-volume 
production is also important, but may be difficult for the smaller companies to achieve in a l l  three 
regions. Creating a portfolio of production sites and markets also provides companies with 
exposure to technical and market developments worldwide.38 
With resources spread globally, it becomes important for the Japanese vehicle producers to 
effectively use their domestic workforce and maintain profitability. Firms must concentrate on 
expanding revenues and profitability, now that the continuous growth era is over. Even though 
Figures 1 and 3 above illustrate how production in Japan has declined in the past two years, and 
export's share of production has declined for the past seven years, further analysis should be 
conducted to show if the same trend holds true for growth measured in revenues. By producing 
critical technology and high value-added components (e.g., transmissions) in Japan, the highly 
skilled workforce is better utilized, and domestic revenues are maximized. Thus, even though 
assembly takes place overseas, much of the profit and control is maintained in Japan. This pattern 
parallels the regionalization of the automotive industry in the United States years ago when engines 
produced in the Detroit area were transported to assembly plants located in various regions of the 
country. Such a global sourcing strategy can also utilize the comparative low-cost labor advantage 
of the companies' operations in Southeast Asia. Assessment of each company's strengths in the 
value chain39 in various markets provides f i s  with a concept of which areas to strengthen and 
which areas to exit. 
While global procurement strategies and hedging overseas may enhance profitability, 
standard economic theory asserts that the key to enhancing profitability is to spread the fixed costs 
over a greater number of units. To the Japanese assemblers, this means extending product- 
development cycles, reducing product variety, standardizing parts, and maintaining high capacity- 
utilization rates. 
38 McAlinden, Commentary: A U .  S. .  Persl~ective on the Globalization of the Automotive Industry, International 
Automotive Industry Forum, Phoenix AZ,  Det,ernber 1990. 
39 Automotive design, procurement, manufacturing. and marketing. 
48 
In order to implement some of the initiatives described above, f m s  must have broad 
geographical scope and high volumes of production in each area. Since most companies do not 
have such large operational scopes, arrangements with other companies become increasingly 
important. Developing cooperative arrangements with other major assemblers and parts makers 
(Japanese, American, and European) will be critical to developing the necessary capability for 
competing in the 2 1 st century. 
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Key Characteristics of Japanese Automobile Manufacturers 
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Profitability for Japanese Automakers and Suppliers in Overseas Expansion 
Outline of Japan Autolnakers' Nortli American and European Facilities Establistled in tile 1980s 
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Appendix 4 
United States and Japan Industry Ratios 
Table 1: Breakdown of facilities by plant type and company 
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US Industry Ratios Over Time (1979 & 1991) 
Table 3: Japanese Industry Ratios Over Time (1981 & 1990) 
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US-Japanese Comparison During 1990s 
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